INTRODUCTION.
DRUG SMUGGLING ABOARD AIRCRAFT.
Assessment of Vulnerability.
Aircraft Security.
Internal Conspiracies.
Aircraft Search Preparation.
Aircraft Search.
Common Areas of Concealment.
Summary.

DRUG SMUGGLING IN CARGO AND BAGGAGE.
Assessment of Vulnerability.
Physical Security.
Procedural Security Standards.
Internal Cargo Conspiracies.
Cargo Documentation.
Personnel Security.
Summary.

CONCEALMENT AREAS IN AIRCRAFT AND AIR CARGO CONTAINERS.
Cargo Holds.
Avionics Compartments.
Lavatories.
Passenger Cabins.
Galleys.
Air Cargo Containers.

SAMPLE AIRCRAFT PREDEPARTURE INSPECTION CHECK-LIST.  INTRODUCTION.

Since its beginning in 1984, the Carrier Initiative Program has done much to improve cooperation between the United States Customs Service and the air transportation industry in the flight against illegal drug smugglers.

In recent years, the criminal element has used legitimate air carriers and cargos to smuggle illegal drugs and other contraband into the United States and other countries. By effectively enhancing security measures at their passenger and cargo facilities, many carriers are taking leadership roles in preventing the use of their conveyances for transporting illegal drugs.

The U.S. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 greatly increased the penal-ties against owner of conveyances found to have transported drugs into the United States. Penalties now stand at U.S. $1.000 per ounce for heroin and cocaine, and U.S. $500 per ounce for mari-juana and its derivatives, a 20-fold increase over previous penalties.

Many of the procedures, methods of detection and methods of pre-vention discussed in this manual have been developed by commer-cial carriers that have been victimized by illegal drug smugglers. These recommendations are presented in the hope that other carri-ers will benefit from them and take appropriate action to protect their aircraft and their interests before they fall victim to the same fate.

This manual is presented in three sections. The first section dis-cusses drug smuggling aboard aircraft. The carrier is urged to as-sess its vulnerability and, based upon that assessment, to enhance its security procedures accordingly.

The second section discusses drug smuggling in cargo and passen-ger baggage. Here the carriers are urged to assess the vulnerability to drug smuggling of their cargo, cargo processing facilities, equip-ment and personnel. Physical and procedural security standards and enhancements are then presented to address areas of weakness.

The third section discusses various techniques used by drug smug-glers to conceal drugs in aircraft compartments and air cargo con-tainers. This information is presented to assist the carrier in identify-ing and reporting abnormalities which might indicate that its aircraft or air cargo containers may conceal illegal drugs.

As more carriers become aware of these and other methods of detection and prevention, and they practice them and share their successes among themselves, illegal drug smugglers will be driven to carriers and forms of transportation offering less of a risk to their business. It is hoped that this manual will be updated regularly as new developments in the fields of security and concealment detec-tion techniques occur.

Feedback from users would be greatly appreciated. Questions, comments and suggestions should be directed to:
Manager, Carrier Initiative Program
Office of International Affairs
U.S. Customs Service
1301 Constitution Avenue. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20229

DRUG SMUGGLING ABOARD AIRCRAFT

Large quantities of illegal drugs are smuggled into the United States and other countries each year utilizing commercial air and sea car-riers, among other methods. These drugs greatly affect our nation’s health and welfare. Recognizing this problem, the U.S. Congress enacted and amended laws to strengthen the ability of law enforce-ment agencies to deal with drug smuggling. A number of European countries are about to do the same. As a result of both these new laws and changes to existing laws, indifference by carriers to drug smuggling aboard their conveyances in no longer a viable policy. The penalties provided by these new laws make it imperative that sea and air carriers exercise the highest degree of care and dili-gence in preventing the use of their conveyances for the importation of illegal drugs.

This section of this manual provides information which may assist commercial air carriers in identifying and addressing those areas of their operations which lend themselves to smuggling aboard their aircraft.

ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY

Many of the carriers participating with the United States Customs Service in the cooperative effort known as the Carrier Initiative Pro-gram have developed security systems tailored to their respective needs. Because of the availability of dangerous drugs at the foreign airports served by these carriers, and because of increasingly bra-zen and imaginative methods employed by smugglers plying the craft along these routes, some carriers have found it necessary to utilize state of the art cargo screening equipment and sophisticated secu-rity procedures to prevent drug smuggling aboard their conveyance. Other carriers have simply enhanced existing security procedures, improved employee awareness, and tightened controls on their cargo, conveyances, facilities and personnel.

The level of security consciousness necessary to prevent the impor-tation of illegal drugs aboard a carrier’s aircraft depends upon the carrier’s vulnerability to those who would use its equipment and services for their illegitimate purposes. Factors which a carrier must consider in assessing its vulnerability include the origin, routing and destination of its aircraft the carrier’s level of control over its bag-gage, cargo and cargo handling equipment at both foreign and United States airports; the carrier’s ability to control access to and egress from its aircraft;  and the carrier’s control over the actions of personnel involved in every step of its operation. These issues are addressed, and methods to reduce carrier vulnerability are pre-sented, in this and the following sections of this manual. But before a carrier can reduce its vulnerability, it must recognize that this vulner-ability exists.
In assessing its vulnerability, the carrier should examine each seg-ment of its operation to identify weaknesses which can easily be exploited by the criminal element. Perhaps the most important con-sideration in identifying a carrier’s risk for use by drug smugglers is its aircraft’s itineraries:
· Do these aircraft call at known drug source or transit countries?
· Did the cargo, which was laden at a relatively safe airport, origi-nate there, or has it been transshipped from a drug source or transit country?
· Can the carrier find out where the cargo originated?
· Does the carrier have control over originating and interline bag-gage? Is a positive baggage ID system utilized for both?

Ten years ago, it was relatively easy to identify the known drug source countries. Since then, severe factors have led to the emer-gence of so-called secondary source or transit countries. These factors include: stepped-up enforcement aimed at shipments origi-nating in known source countries; increased availability of and in-creased demand for illegal drugs; the huge profits obtained from this enterprise; plus political instability and improved transportation sys-tems and services in both source and transit countries.

In the past three years, record cocaine and marijuana seizures have been detected in both air and sea cargo originating in or transiting through Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Netherlands Antilles, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. Articles have been written in newspapers and periodicals describing the develop-ment of hybrid strains of coca plants which may be grown and culti-vated in the Amazonian jungles of Brazil; about the discovery of opium poppy fields in Colombian jungles; and about marijuana culti-vation in equatorial Africa. These seizures of illegal drugs, and the evidence pointing to the widespread availability of illegal drugs throughout the Third World, suggest that few ports, if any, can be considered safe.

In assessing the vulnerability of an aircraft’s itinerary to drug smug-gling, carrier personnel should:
· Identify airports and itineraries which are high risk for the smuggling of illegal drugs.
· Analyze aircraft information to determine when an aircraft is at risk for drug smuggling.

All available information relative to an aircraft’s ports of call and cargo history should be gathered and analyzed. For instance: What are the aircraft’s ports of origin, ports of destination and intermedi-ate ports? What is the country of origin of the cargo? Has it been transshipped, and if so, what where the feeder aircraft’s or vessels’ ports of call? In addition, the aircraft’s log, and other records should be reviewed to determine if any illegal drugs have been found on the aircraft which can be linked to:
· A specific type of cargo.
· Cargo from a specific country
· Cargo loaded at a specific port
· Cargo transhipped from a specific port.
· Cargo going to a specific destination port.
· Specific crew members operating the aircraft when illegal drugs have been found.

The aircraft’s log should be reviewed to determine if current cir-cumstances would allow a recurrence of the same type of smuggling attempt, if prior operations of the aircraft presented any particular enforcement problems, or if any crew  members presented any particular enforcement problems on previous flights. It should also be determined from the log or other records whether smuggling at-tempts were encountered during that aircraft’s previous flights or by other planes of the same airline, in particular:
· Specific drugs encountered.
· Quantity
· Location
· Method of manifesting, if in cargo
· Method of concealment
· Port of origin/destination, if know.

Also from the aircraft’s log book, information relative to aircraft re-pairs, specifically those that may occur or recur at airports located in drug source or transit countries should be analyzed. Are these repairs:
· Occurring at normal intervals?
· Being performed by the same repair facility, mechanic or con-tractor?
· Are the emergency in nature?
· What areas of the aircraft were accessed for the repair?
· When were these areas next accessed at repair facilities in the United States? How often? How soon after the aircraft’s return?
· Who reported the need for these repairs?

After carefully analyzing all available information relative to an air-craft’s itinerary, a risk level can be determined. An aircraft may be considered high risk if a review of the aircraft’s log produces af-firmative responses to any of the questions covered above indicat-ing either positive drug smuggling activity in the past, or excessive, abnormal and repetitive maintenance in airports located in drug source or transit countries. To determine the risk of a particular airport, an affirmative response to the following would likely indicate that an airport is a high risk:
· Is it a known active drug port?
· Is it a known transshipment port?
· Is it located in a known drug source country?
· Is it located in a known drug transshipment country?
· Is it located in a country which has a border with a drug source or transshipment country?

Another very important aspect of carrier’s operation which must be examined in assessing its vulnerability is the security of the convey-ance itself. Commercial passenger and cargo aircraft are very large, and complex conveyances, and are inviting targets for exploi-tation by illegal drug smugglers. By enhancing its security, the carrier can prevent illegal drugs from being placed aboard the aircraft. By practicing good, sound security procedures throughout the flight, a carrier’s ability to detect possible concealment on board provides an additional deterrent to smuggling attempts.

The carrier should consider the following in assessing the strengths and weaknesses of its aircraft security program:
· Is a guard utilized while the aircraft is on the ground to prevent unauthorized persons, or articles which they may carry from boarding the aircraft?
· Are packages, parcels, tool boxes and other items carried aboard by visitors, ground support personnel or other persons restricted or examined prior to boarding or leaving the aircraft?
· Do ground support personnel have unlimited access to aircraft compartments while loading or unloading cargo, baggage, and catering supplies or cleaning the aircraft?
· Are there compartments, panels or areas on board that do not require routine access either while the aircraft is in flight or on the ground? If so, are these areas locked or sealed to prevent unauthorized access?
· Are pre-departure and enroute searches routinely conducted of all or randomly selected parts of the aircraft?
· Has a search checklist been devised, and is it used?
· Have procedures been developed to guide personnel when drugs are found on board?
· Are crew members involved in drug smuggling or drug use?

In assessing an aircraft’s vulnerability, involvement by crew mem-bers in either drug smuggling or drug use must neither be overlooked nor tolerated. Crew members should be carefully observed for any of the following behavior patterns to determine their smuggling risk:
· Nervous or suspicious behavior;
· Unusually large amounts of money;
· Unusually amount of articles legally purchased;
· Expensive clothing;
· List containing names and references to money, weights or units of any commodity;
· Meetings with persons in airports which the crew member is not known to have visited before;
· Unusual interest in a particular area of the aircraft;
· Unusual interest in a particular passenger cargo shipment or container;
· Tools in personal belongings not associated with on board oc-cupation.

In addition to being a safety hazard to the aircraft and the other crew members and passengers, the use of drugs by crew members in-creases an aircraft’s vulnerability to being used to transport com-mercial quantities of illegal drugs. Crew members should be ob-served for any telltale signs of drug use, or if they exhibit any of the following behavior patterns:
· Nervousness;
· Avoidance of others, antisocial or irrational behavior;
· Frequent unexplained movements;
· Drastic changes in work habits, lifestyle;
· Slurred speech, sweat, glazed eyes;
· Rolling papers, hash pipe, roach clips or other paraphernalia in personal possessions.

AIRCRAFT SECURITY.

The best way that a carrier can ensure that its aircraft will not be utilized to import illegal drugs into the United States is to prevent the drug from being placed on the aircraft in the foreign port of lading. Quite simply, if it does get on the aircraft, then it can’t get off.

Although customs, traditions and past practices have led to the de-velopment of both formal and informal protocol regarding the types and numbers of persons permitted to board and visit carrier’s air-craft while it is on the ground, the consequences which may result from the detection of illegal drugs on board an aircraft upon its arri-val in the United States require the carrier to tighten its control over these persons while they are on board. Effective aircraft security begins with and depends upon the carrier’s ability to control access to its aircraft. Persons boarding the aircraft should be warned that all packages, parcels or other items brought on board the aircraft are subject to search.

While the aircraft in on the ground in both foreign and United States airports, it should be guarded. All persons attempting to board the aircraft should be challenged and not permitted to board without legitimate reasons. Their activities and movements on or near the aircraft should be monitored. Adequate fixed or portable lighting, if not provided by the airport, should be provided by the carrier to illu-minate the aircraft access areas during nighttime ground operations.

Close attention and supervision must be given to all baggages and cargo as it is prepared, staged, transported to and loaded into the aircraft. A Positive Baggage Identification System should be utilized. This system matches every piece of baggages with the passengers who caused it to be checked in. The passenger’s travel documents are checked to verify the accuracy of the identity. If the passenger chooses not to fly on that aircraft, his or her baggage is removed prior to the aircraft’s departure.

Additionally, baggage tags should be strictly controlled. An effective system will not only identify the passenger who checked the baggage in, but also the airline employee who issued the tag and placed it on the baggage.

In addition to the Positive Baggage Identification System, uniformed guards, or airline management personnel should meet all arriving international aircraft to supervise the unloading of passengers, bag-gage and cargo from the aircraft to the appropriate Customs proc-essing or staging area. As baggage is unloading, it should be ob-served to ensure it is properly tagged and labeled. All cargo and main shipments should be compared to the manifest to ensure that each piece is listed on the manifest and the marks, numbers, weights and quantities of the outer packages or containers agree with the manifest. Any discrepancies noted, either in baggage or cargo unloaded from the aircraft, should immediately be brought to the attention of a Customs officer.

Even with the tightest security, the determined smuggler may still get his contraband aboard. To increase the likelihood of detection, and therefore increase the deterrent effect, frequent, random aircraft searches should be conducted prior to the departure of the aircraft for the United States and at intermediate airports while enroute. Because aircraft are so large and offer so many different places for concealment, compartments which are seldom used or which may be secured without affecting the safety or operation of the aircraft should be sealed or locked. The aircraft should be divided into areas of accountability, and  the appropriate crew member assigned the responsibility of ensuring that his area is drug free.

INTERNAL CONSPIRACIES.

There are two basic methods in which aircraft may be utilized for drug smuggling. The first method involves an organized conspiracy.

The organized conspiracy generally moves large quantities, i.e. 10 to several hundred kilograms of marijuana, cocaine or heroin. These conspiracies may involve several, if not all, crew members, ground support personnel and outside contractors. Cockpit crew and even management of the airline may be involved. Concealment tech-niques may be very simple or highly sophisticated. The conspirators have ample time to hide illegal drugs long after the arrival of the aircraft in the United States. the detection may require substantial time and effort and the use of tools. The concealment location is likely to be a primary aircraft system, such as fuel tanks, sanitary holding tanks, specially constructed compartments or other internal or external aircraft areas.

The second method involves the individual entrepreneur. He usually moves small quantities, .e. several ounces to five or six kilograms of illegal drugs. He usually operates alone or with one or two confed-erates at most. Airline crew members and management personnel are rarely involved. Concealment techniques will not have had a great deal of time to operate unobserved. Detection is not likely to require a great deal of time, effort, or the use of more than a screw-driver or wrench. The concealment location is likely to be an area where both airline personnel and passengers have access.

To detect either the organized conspiracy or the individual entrepre-neur, airline management should require aircraft to be searched frequently prior to departure from high risk ports, or on the ground in intermediate airports while thorough, partial, compartmental or ran-dom. The fact that they are conducted frequently presents an addi-tional deterrent to drug smuggling on board the carrier’s aircraft.

AIRCRAFT SEARCH PREPARATION.

When the decision to search an aircraft has been made, the next task is to plan the operation of the actual search. The operation plan should include detailed standard operating procedures. Contingency plans for safety in an emergency and for the interception and proc-essing of contraband should also be included.
Prior to conducting the search, the configuration of the aircraft should be reviewed to ensure that:
· The aircraft is divided into manageable areas for the search;
· All areas of the aircraft are covered unless a selective search is planned;
· Each searcher has ready access to the assigned section of the aircraft and is aware of compartments, panels, and voids lo-cated between the interior and exterior skin of the aircraft within the assigned area;
· Each searcher can successfully search the assigned are in approximately the same time.

In preparation for the search, the review of the aircraft’s configura-tion should identify the following:
· Number of decks, especially in large wide-body aircraft;
· Number and location of cargo holds and access points;
· Number and location of fuel tanks, sanitary tanks and voids;
· Size and layout of galleys, avionics spaces and areas that may be easily accessed via internal and external panels;
· Accessibility to ventilation system;
· Passenger cabin seating arrangement, life vest and life raft storage areas, overhead compartments and emergency oxygen supply storage spaces.

All equipment needed for the search should be determinded during preparation. Common items which may be needed include:
· Flashlights with fresh batteries;
· Screwdrivers, probes, mirrors;
· Rubber gloves;
· Evidence preservation bags and envelopes;
· Forms as required to document activities.

Assigment of search responsibilities should be based on the follow-ing factors:
· Number of persons needed to implement search plan;
· Mechanical abilities required;
· Capabilities of available personnel, i.e.:
Physical condition,
Experience,
Enthusiasm and other personal qualities.
Ability to function under stress, in an emergency or in dan-gerous situations;
· Trustworthiness;
· Safety.

A search strategy should be determined. Areas to be searched should be identified and rated according to the degree of priority and thoroughness of the intended search. Thoroughness is usually de-termined by type, size, weight and volume of the contraband being sought.

A search checklist should be developed for each particular aircraft operated by the carrier. By utilizing the search checklist, searches of the aircraft will be more systematic and through. A sample search checklist, which was jointly developed by Customs and air carriers participating in the Carrier Initiative Program, is provided in Appendix 1.

AIRCRAFT SEARCH

The pilot or designated search team leader should assign crew members to specific sub-areas. This procedure ensures that no areas which are designated for search are missed and that no ar-eas are searched more than once.

The search should be conducted routinely during preparation for boarding passengers, lading cargo and as part of the pre-flight check. Areas of the aircraft that do not require routine access should be sealed with serially numbered seals which may be checked for tampering or may indicate unauthorized entry.

The exterior of the aircraft should be searched by a flight deck offi-cer, or when possible a team consisting of ground management personnel and a member of the flight deck crew. All sealed com-partments should be checked for signs of tampering. Avionics and other areas of the aircraft which may be easily accessed from the exterior of the aircraft should be opened, examined and then sealed. Aircraft wheel-wells and ground service ports should be searched for small packages of contraband.

Cargo holds should be searched prior to lading cargo or baggage. Panels and access points within the cargo hold should examined to reveal tampering or unauthorized access. Many such panels in the cargo holds provide access to areas capable of concealing large loads of contraband. These areas have been used for individual shipments of illegal drugs which have weighed in excess of hun-dreds, even thousands, of pounds. Once examined, these areas should be sealed until cargo or baggage should be supervised to ensure these areas are not accessed during these operations.

The interior of the aircraft should be searched by members of the cabin crew. The aircraft should be systematically searched. Area of the cabin should be assigned to each crew member. Using a search list, all areas which are accessible from the interior of the aircraft should be searched, or if sealed, examined for signs of tampering or unauthorized entry.

All interior aircraft searches should be completed prior to boarding passengers. If catering or other ground services continue while passengers are boarding the aircraft, those areas accessed by these personnel should be checked again after their services are completed. During flight, cabin crew members should observe pas-sengers entering lavatories or other common work areas with par-cels or pieces of baggage.

Upon arrival at a U.S. airport, the pilot should report all instances where illegal drugs or contraband have been found, the method of concealment and dispositions of the contraband to the U.S. Cus-toms Service. Any illegal drugs or contraband located during aircraft searches should be left undisturbed if possible. Contraband that may not be left undisturbed should be secured with minimal handling , reported to the appropriate governmental authority in the country where it was discovered (if discovered prior to departure to the Unites States) and/or preserved for appropriate follow-up action by the U.S. Customs Service.

Upon the aircraft’s arrival in the United States, U.S. Customs per-sonnel will take custody of the illegal drugs and attempt to gather additional evidence which might provide clues to the identity of the smuggler. If fingerprints are required as a part of a carriers pre-employment application procedure, latent prints taken from the packages containing the illegal drugs may be compared and might lead to the arrest of the airline employee involved in the conspiracy and his removal from the airline.

COMMON AREAS OF CONCEALMENT.

Though not all-inclusive, the following list indicates where Customs authorities have found contraband during searches of aircraft:

CABIN AREA

· Lavatories
* Beneath toilet shroud;
* Behind toilet in storage compartments;
* Behind toilet area paneling;
* Paper towel and tissue compartment;
* Sanitary napkin compartment;
* Storage area in service module;
* Suspended from wires behind sink-mounted light panel;
* In, under and behind waste-can located in compartment un-der the sing;
* Behind speaker in ceiling:
* Emergency oxygen mask storage area.
· Galleys
* Overhead light panel (access to ceiling);
* Behind electrical service panels;
* Behind access to water cut-off valves;
* Inside and behind storage bins;
* Space between top of elevator shaft and ceiling;
* Elevator escape hatch;
* Food and beverage carts;
* Preparation areas.
· Seats
* Beneath seat cushion;
* Inside life vest compartment (vest removed);
* Beneath cloth cover of seat-back under fold-out table;
* Inside emergency oxygen mask storage area.
· Other cabin areas
* Beneath flight attendants’ seat cushion and headrest;
* In life raft storage bins in ceiling and overhead luggage compartments;
* within dummy life extinguishers;
* Behind floor vent covers;
* Behind wall panels, suspended on strings from overhead wiring;
* Inside ceiling lighting panels;
* In compartments built into the cabin floors, under carpeting.
· Cockpit
* Behind instrument panels;
* Behind wall and ceiling panels;
* Under seat cushions;
* Inside headset, book and document storage area.
· Avionics
* Under insulation material along walls, floors;
* Inside electrical access panels;
* Inside dummy avionics equipment modules;
* Under floor panels near external access points.
· Doors
* Rear door stairwell, compartments on both sides and over-head;
* Emergency escape chute storage area;
* Door framing and panels.

CARGO HOLDS
· Wall panels
* Behind forward and aft wall panels leading to voids and ma-chinery compartments;
* Behind blowout panels;
* Behind access doors to flight recorder compartment.
· Ceiling panels
· Floor panels
· Other cargo hold areas:
* Spare parts lockers;
* Oil cans;
* Spare tires;
* Behind doors and door slide;
* Inside oxygen supply tank storage;
* Inside aft support pin storage chute.

EXTERIOR ACCESS POINTS
· Avionics compartments;
· Wheel-well areas;
· Service panels;
· Fuel tank inspection access points;
· All exterior access points leading to compartments, tanks and voids;
· Cable runs.
·
SUMMARY

Most drug smuggling aboard commercial aircraft can be prevented by enhanced security measures. Frequent unannounced searches by airline crew members and ground personnel act as a strong de-terrent to would-be drug smugglers. Other steps which carriers can take to prevent the use of their aircraft for drug smuggling include:
· An identification of the carrier’s risk through a through assess-ment of  vulnerability which includes:
* Examination of aircraft itineraries;
* Examination of aircraft logs and other records for past illegal drug trafficking experience;
* Examination of the types and origin of cargos carried;
* Examination of aircraft procedural security during aircraft ground operations;
* Examination of possible crew involvement.
· Improvements to aircraft security
· Identification of crew involvement.
· Aircraft search preparation;
· Aircraft search techniques;
· Identification of common concealment methods;
· Sealing access points and compartments that do not effect the safe operation of the aircraft.

DRUG SMUGGLING IN CARGO AND BAGGAGE

The facilities used to receive, store, stage, lade and unlade cargo and baggage are subject to compromise by smugglers of illegal drugs. Conspiracies involving carrier employees or contract workers in both foreign and U.S. airports of lading and unlading can seriously jeopardize the carrier’s survivability. Carriers must be alert to secu-rity weaknesses in all facilities and in procedures used to process and prepare cargo for shipment and for ultimate delivery to the con-signee.

ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY.

In exercising the highest care and diligence in preventing the use of their conveyances to import illegal drugs, carriers must identify weaknesses in their physical, procedural and documentation control procedures relative to their cargo and passenger baggage opera-tions. Additionally, carriers should identify and correct weaknesses in their personnel security procedures, particularly those controlling the activities of persons involved with cargo reception, storage, lading, unlading and cargo documentation.

The carrier’s ability to control access to the area adjacent to its aircraft, the storage facilities for its cargo and the pre and post-lading areas for its baggage, cargo pallets and containers, directly affects its ability to prevent the use of its conveyances for the impor-tation of illegal drugs. Items to consider include:
· Is the lighting adequate to prevent the manipulation of cargo or containers for the introduction of removal of contraband?
· Are empty containers examined prior to lading to detect altera-tions, and once examined are they sealed or stored in such a manner as to prevent  access by smugglers?
· Are procedures established to ensure that baggage is controlled and supervised from the time it is checked in until it is laden on board the aircraft?
· Once checked in, are bags banded to deter unauthorized ac-cess while in the custody of the air carrier?
· Is baggage unlading supervised to ensure that all bags are re-moved from the aircraft and delivered directly to the Customs processing facility?
· Are procedures established to ensure that containers and cargo are transferred between the aircraft and storage area directly, without intermediate staging or diversions?
· Is fencing adequate to prevent unauthorized access to cargo or containers?
· Are drug detector dogs available for pre-screening baggage, cargo and containers? If so, are they utilized?
· Is access to facilities restricted to authorized personnel?

Carriers are responsible for ensuring that all cargo laden aboard their aircraft is listed on the manifest and that the marks, numbers, weights and quantities of the outer packages or containers agree with the manifest. In recent years, the criminal element has con-cealed large quantities of illegal drugs in legitimate shipments of cargo without the knowledge of the legitimate shipments of cargo without the knowledge of the legitimate shipper or consignee. Often, these attempts to “piggyback” illegal drugs in legitimate shipments can easily be detected and prevented by the carrier if the carrier exercised the proper care and diligence in monitoring and verifying the documentation and physical characteristics relative to the cargo shipment. The carrier should assess its vulnerability to the illegiti-mate use of its cargo by examining its procedures and considering the following:
· Does the carrier verify the marks, numbers, weights and quanti-ties of cargo received for lading against the documents pre-sented?
· Are procedures established to record the identify of persons booking cargo?
· Is this a regular shipper? If so, is this the commodity normally shipped?
· Does the commodity require special handling or equipment? If so, did the shipper request to provide the necessary  handling equipment?
· Is this a new, frequent or relatively infrequent shipper or con-signee?
· Does the carrier accept last minute or “must ride this flight” shipments?

Because of the huge profits associated with drug smuggling, the very real possibility of compromising personnel within the carrier’s organization as well as those in organizations responsible for servic-ing the carrier’s aircraft, it is auxiliary equipment and cargo, must be addressed. In assessing its vulnerability, the carrier should examine both its personnel pre-employment procedures and its procedures for detecting involvement by those already employed.

In examining their pre-employment practices, carriers should con-sider:
· Are applicants for employment required to provide detailed background information relative to their character, employment history, criminal record and drug use? Is this information veri-fied?
· Do applicants provide fingerprints as part of the application process?
· Are police checks conducted? are urinalysis, hair analysis or other testing employed to detect drug use?
· Has the applicant worked for other carriers? Why did he leave?

In examining its personnel security system concerning those per-sonnel already employed, the carrier should consider the following:
· Is there an ongoing drug awareness and education program?
· Are all personnel required to wear distinctive identification cards or badges that also act as authorization for access to cargo storage of document processing areas?
· Is there an anti-drug commitment by management? Is this commitment communicated through all levels of the organiza-tion?
· Do all employees know where to report suspicious packages or parcels, discrepancies in cargo, or possible involvement by other members of the organization?
· Are any employees exhibiting signs of involvement, such as:
Change in appearance;
Changes in standard of living not commensurate with salary;
Frequent request for shift changes to work particular air-craft, work stations of cargo handling assignments?

These are just some of the physical, procedural and personnel con-trol each carrier should examine to assess its vulnerability to drug smuggling. In making these assessments, carrier must ask the “who, what, where, why, when and how” questions and accepts nothing less than honest answers. Each of these areas is discussed more thoroughly below.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Any program to improve cargo security must deal initially with the physical security provided by the cargo handling and storage facility itself. All cargo handling and storage facilities in both foreign and U.S. ports should provide physical barriers against unauthorized access to cargo. Usually this will require covered structures with apertures which can be securely locked. In addition, fencing or other partitions of substantial material may be needed to prevent unauthor-ized persons and vehicles from entering cargo storage and handling areas.

Fencing. Where fencing is required, it should enclose and area around cargo storage structures, support buildings and exterior stored cargo sufficient to provide maneuvering space for pick-up and delivery vehicles and to prevent use of buildings or cargo to surmount the fence. The fence line must be inspected regularly for integrity and any damage promptly repaired.
 

Buildings and Yards. All buildings and yards used to house cargo and containers, and associated support buildings, should be con-structed of materials which resist unlawful entry. The integrity of structures must be maintained by periodic inspection and repair. Security protection should be provided for all doors and windows.

Gates. In fences, the number of gates should be the minimum nec-essary for access. All fences gates should be at least as substantial as the fence. Gates through which vehicles or personnel enter or exit should be manned or under observation by management or security personnel.

Gate Houses. Operators of facilities handling substantial volumes of cargo should maintain manned gate houses at all vehicle en-trances and exits during business hours.

Parking. Private passengers vehicles should be prohibited from parking in cargo areas or immediately adjacent to cargo storage buildings. Access to employee parking areas should be subject to security controls.

Lighting. Adequate lighting, either fixed or portable, should be pro-vided for the following areas:
· Entrances, exits and around gate houses;
· Cargo areas, including container, trailer and railcar holding ar-eas;
· Along fence lines;
· All parking areas;
· Areas adjacent to aircraft during lading and unlading.

Locks, Locking Devices and Key Controls. Locks or locking devices used on buildings, gates and equipment should be so con-structed as to provide positive protection against unauthorized entry. The issuance of all locks and keys should be controlled by manage-ment or security personnel.

Closed Circuit Television Surveillance Systems. If used, closed circuit television surveillance systems should be designed to ensure that all areas of the cargo facility are monitored. Such sys-tems should ensure that no blind spots exist that can be exploited by internal conspirators.

PROCEDURAL SECURITY STANDARDS.

Because the effectiveness of physical security standards can be nullified if there is insufficient control of documentation and person-nel entering, working in and leaving the facility, each carrier should also analyze the adequacy of its procedural security measures. Although some carriers have little or no direct control over the re-ception and storage of cargo prior to its being laden on board their aircraft, it is imperative that carriers ensure that terminal operators servicing their aircraft take steps to improve their security specifi-cally to target and prevent the smuggling of illegal drugs.

Security Personnel. Operators of cargo handling facilities should employ a security officer or assign a particular officer of the firm to be responsible for security. All operators handling a substantial vol-ume of international cargo should provide guards to protect the cargo.

Passenger baggage staging and make-up areas should also be monitored by security or management personnel to prevent the in-troduction of “unmanifested” baggage into the legitimate passenger baggage system.

Communications. Adequate and reliable communications should be provided between elements of the terminal security force and between the security force, U.S. Customs officers and local police. Two-way radios are highly recommended.

Employee Identification System. All operators of facilities han-dling a substantial volume of cargo should employ an identification card system to distinguish personnel authorized to enter cargo and document processing areas. The ID card should contain a physical description, color photograph, signature and a reasonable expiration date. The identification card should be displayed at all times while the employee is in restricted areas. All personnel who must have unescorted access to a Customs Security Area must openly display a Customs seal or strip on their ID cards while in these areas.

Independent Contractors. The background and corporate struc-ture of independent contractors providing baggage services, janitor-ial service, refuse disposal and other services should be verified. Access by independent contractors to the facility should be under strict security controls.

Positive Baggage Identification System. Baggage check-in pro-cedures should be designed to ensure that each checked bag can be positively identified and traced to both the passenger checking that baggage and the airline employee who received it for transport.
· Each bag should be labeled with passengers name and address. This information should be verified against the passenger’s travel documents.
· All baggage tags should be strictly controlled to prevent unau-thorized use.
· The control number of the baggage tag should be recorded on the passenger’s ticket.
· The code number for the airline employee issuing the baggage tag should be written on each tag.
· The bag tag number of each bag checked by a passenger should be recorded on a boarding list. If the passenger does not board the aircraft, the bags should be removed from the aircraft. If the bags cannot be removed, U.S. Customs should be notified prior to the aircraft’s arrival in the United States.

Cargo Reception and Delivery Procedures. Arrivals and depar-tures of trucks and other vehicles entering cargo facilities should be recorded in logs to show entry and exit times. The names of all driv-ers of vehicles delivering cargo should be recorded to provide and audit trail in the event that illegal drugs are later seized from the cargo upon its arrival in the United States. Gate passes should be issued to truckmen and other onward carriers to control and identify those authorized to enter the facility. Verification of the identify and authority of the carrier requesting delivery of cargo should be made prior the cargo’s release.

Air waybills for cargo delivered for shipment should be checked for accuracy prior to acceptance. Complete names and street ad-dresses of both the shipper and consignee should be required. Air waybills providing only a contact number or a notice that the con-signee will call should be rejected. The cargo should be adequately described, and the weights and piece count indicated. Failing to insist on accurate documentation may lead to the unknowing sub-mission by the carrier of a false manifest. If the merchandise falsely manifested is a controlled substance, the carrier may be subjected to a penalty, or even the seizure of its aircraft.

Aircraft Cargo Containers and Containerized Shipments. Empty containers should be examined to ensure that no alterations have been made which could facilitate the movement of contraband. Whenever a sealed container enters or leaves a facility, the seals should be inspected to ensure that they are intact and that there is no evidence of tampering. The seal numbers should be recorded on the shipping documents.

Full containers which arrive sealed should be weighted to verify cargo weights as declared on the air waybill to ensure the accuracy of the manifest. If narcotic detector dogs are available, they should be utilized to screen loaded containers upon arrival and prior to lading.

Seals should be controlled and released to as few persons as pos-sible. All persons should be required to maintain strict control of, and be held accountable for, numbered seals. A seal distribution log which indicates to whom seals have been released should be main-tained.

During the lading process all cargo and containers should be moved directly from the storage facility to the aircraft without additional staging or diversions. Seals on containerized cargo should be checked immediately prior to lading to detect tampering. If a seal is broken, or appears to have been tampered with, the container iden-tification number should be reported to the U.S. Customs personnel at the first U.S. port of arrival. Any unusual odors, specifically those associated with marijuana or cocaine, should be investigated to discover their source. If an odor is emanating from container, pallet or a particular piece of cargo. U.S. Customs personnel at the first U.S. port of arrival should be advised prior to the aircraft’s arrival.

Prior to the arrival of an aircraft at a U.S. airport, an adequate area in the warehouse should be cleared and prepared to receive the arriving cargo. Upon arrival, all cargo should move from the aircraft to the warehouse without any diversions or intermediate staging. As cargo is unloaded from the aircraft, it should be verified against the manifest to ensure the numbers, marks, weights and descriptions of the outside containers are as listed on the manifest.

Security Education and Awareness. All employees involved in the handling of cargo or cargo documentation should be made aware of security requirements and of the consequences of failure. Employees should be reminded to maintain legible and accurate cargo tallies, process only legible documents, safeguard the confi-dentiality of shipping and entry documents and obtain clearly written signatures and identification from shippers, consignees and other persons delivering or receiving cargo. Additionally, procedures should be established for reporting security violations.

INTERNAL CARGO CONSPIRACIES.

The term “internal cargo conspiracy” refers to the smuggling of ille-gal drugs by airline employees, warehousemen, contract cargo handlers, freight forwarders, truckers, security guards, etc. Internal conspirators are well prepared to commit their illegal acts. They are sophisticated; they understand the intricacies of international trade; they are knowledgeable about the details of complicated cargo documentation, and they are totally familiar with Customs examina-tion procedures and other enforcement efforts in effect at their ports. Using this knowledge, they often circumvent interdiction ef-forts successfully.

Airline employees become successful conspirators because of their familiarity with airline schedules, aircraft and cargo routing, advance cargo information systems and Customs procedures. Airline internal cargo conspiracies are most likely to be active at:
· Airline freight storage facilities during cargo reception, pallet make-up or depalletization;
· Planeside during or immediately after unlading or lading;
· At intermediate cargo processing facilities, i.e.: cold storage areas.

Internal conspiracies usually take one of three forms:
· The TAP: This term is used to describe the illegal opening of international freight or containers. In the case of imported cargo, the unauthorized person will take the illegal drugs from the ship-ment prior to Customs examination. The Customs officer, upon opening the shipment, will find only the manifested cargo.
· The SWITCH: This term descries the exchanging of a clean shipment for a shipment containing illegal drugs. When the shipment is presented for examination, the Customs officer will be looking at the clean shipment. The switch is usually made just after the arrival of the cargo or just before its departure. There may be two identical shipments for export, one legitimate and one containing only drugs. Only one will be manifested and the other can be removed at destination. This is a combination of SWITCH and PULL.
· The PULL: This term describes the taking of an entire shipment, usually containing only illegal drugs. Such a shipment can be manifested or unmanifested. The Customs officer never has an opportunity to examine the shipment, since the illegal drugs are taken just after arrival. The PULL is used for all types of smug-gling.

To detect existing cargo conspiracies, air cargo terminal operators should perform daily walk-throughs of their facilities. They should be aware of unmanifested cargo, cargo which has been tampered with, cargo in out-of-the-way places, cargo without normal shipping marks and containers with altered numbers and broken seals.

To prevent internal conspiracies from being successful, the air cargo terminal operator must familiarize himself with the routing of cargo flowing through his facility. He must also be familiar with cargo documentation and be observant of movements of persons around recently arrived or imminently departing cargo. The terminal opera-tors must also maintain a high degree of security at his facilities.

CARGO DOCUMENTATION.

All personnel involved in handling documents relative to air cargo have the opportunity to identify suspect shipments which should be refused for transportation on the carrier’s aircraft. If already on board an aircraft, such cargo should be referred to U.S. Customs officers for follow-up action. A careful review of actual air waybills will aid in determining suspect shipments. Evaluating deviations from the norm among information elements within air waybills will identify potential high-risk shipments. A review of air waybills using the five W’s should be routinely conducted by persons receiving cargo for transportation to the United States or processing cargo documents prior to delivery of the cargo in the United States:
· Who is the exporter or shipper?
· Who is the consignee?
- Is the shipment consigned to a broker?
- If the shipment is consigned to a Company, is the company well know?
- Who owns the company?
· Who is the freight forwarder?
- Is he well known?
- Does he have a good reputation?
· What is being exported (imported)?
- Is the commodity logical for the exporter and importer?
- Does the company regularly export/import the type of mer-chandise described on the air waybill?
- Does a particular exporter repeatedly send samples only, and rarely, if  ever send full shipments?
· When was the air waybill executed?
· When will the freight arrive?
· Is there an inexplicable time lapse in the cargo movement?
· Where did the shipment originate?
- Is the country of origin a source or transit country for illegal drugs?
- Is the point of origin logical for the nature of the goods?
· Where is the shipper located?
- Is the address complete?
- Is the address legitimate?
- Does the address indicate a desire for anonymity. (i.e. hotel, P.O. box)?
- Is the address appropriate to the nature of goods, i.e., com-mercial shipment to a residential address?
- Is the shipper located in a different country than the freight for-warder?
· Was the air waybill executed in the same country as the shipper and the port of loading of the cargo?
· Where was the freight paid?
- Has an attempt been made to maintain anonymity by prepaying freight and other charges? (Prepayment by a private party for shipment of personal effects is frequently required, but pre-payment by a commercial exporter or importer is unusual.)
· Why was this particular airline selected to transport the goods?
· Why was this particular routing, if it was not the most direct and expeditious, utilized from the contry of origin to the country of destination?
· Why was the cargo transshipped, if, in fact, it was?

After reviewing an air waybill, suspect bills should be prioritized:
· Eliminate from further consideration those air waybills which, after scrutiny, do not appear to deviate significantly from the norm.
· Rank the remaining suspect air waybills with respect to their potential for drug smuggling.
· Secure high-risk shipments. By its very nature, a suspect ship-ment is a high risk for everyone involved with it.
· Establish and maintain tight security on high-risk shipments.
· Notify U.S. Customs officers of your suspicions.
 
 

PERSONNEL SECURITY.

All illegal drugs have one thing in common: they are inanimate. They will not conceal themselves  in aircraft, containers, cargo, or wrap themselves around a person’s body. They will neither pack them-selves in baggage nor crawl inside false walls, floors or ceilings, illegal drugs, like carriers, need people to move them from point A to point B. Carriers, however, do not need people who move ille-gal drugs!

Simply put, there are three types of people in the workplace:
· Those who are involved in smuggling illegal drugs.
· Those who are not involved in smuggling illegal drugs.
· Those who are caught in the middle.

The people caught in the middle can be brought to the side of the law if a positive anti-drug attitude and security consciousness is resident in the workplace and is communicated from upper management down and through all levels of the organization. Those involved in drug smuggling can be prevented access to the carrier’s workplace through effective pre-employment screening and, if already em-ployed, eliminated through effective personnel security practices.

An effective pre-employment screening program begins with the requirement that all applicants for a position in the organization, regardless of how unimportant the position may seem, complete a written application. The application process should require the appli-cant to provide information which will permit the carrier to judge the applicant in terms of his honesty, integrity and reliability. The carrier should establish a solid hiring policy, especially regarding em-ployee’s use or involvement with illegal drugs.

The application should be thorough and should provide the following information:
· Explanation of frequent job shifts or gaps in employment;
· Complete employment history, including salary information, du-ties and responsibilities, reasons for leaving and the name and contact numbers of previous employers;
· All names used by the applicant, type of military service and discharge, affiliations and memberships in organizations;
· Educational background, including information concerning schools attended and dates of attendance;
· Citizenship or immigration status;
· Current residence and information relative to residences occu-pied during the last 10 years;
· Personal, business and credit references;
· Criminal history including conviction dates and locations.

Restate the organization hiring policy on the form, and set conditions to which the applicant agrees by signing the application, such as:
· Misrepresentation of any item of information required by the form shall be considered an act of dishonesty and cause for dismissal.
· Permission is granted to the employer or his agent to conduct background and credit checks.
· The application for employment does not in any way obligate the employer to hire the applicant.

The completed application should be thoroughly reviewed to insure that it is accurate an complete. Applications which are incomplete should not be accepted. As part of the application process, the ap-plicant should be fingerprinted and photographed.

The process of fingerprinting serves two major purposes. First, it acts as a deterrent to applicants who are thieves or wanted per-sons, and second, should an employee’s fingerprints be found later on packages of illegal drugs or other evidence of a crime, positive identification can be made.

Each applicant should be interviewed by a trained interviewer. The interview should be designed to verify the information provided in the application. The interview should also be used to verify or clarify derogatory information submitted on the application or discovered during the background investigation. Additionally, the interview should be designed to obtain information not included on the appli-cation and to provide an opportunity to appraise the applicant’s per-sonality, character, motivation, honesty and other personal charac-teristics face to face. During the interview, the organization’s secu-rity policies, especially those relating to drug abuse or involvement, should be thoroughly discussed.

Using the information contained in the application, and the interview, a background investigation should be conducted to confirm the va-lidity of the information. This investigation should search for any deliberate misrepresentation, falsification or omission of material facts, and any criminal conduct, especially if it was drug related.

Personnel security does not end with an effective preemployment screening program. All employees should be informed of the organi-zation’s overall security policies and of procedures established to guide them in their day-to-day participation in the security system. Access to aircraft, cargo facilities or cargo document processing areas should be restricted. Color-coded or stylized identification cards displayed by all personnel in the workplace aid in identifying unauthorized access to restricted areas. Personnel who work in these areas should be trained to recognize when the security of their particular work area has been breached and to whom they should report these violations.

Employees in all levels of the organization should be trained to rec-ognize behavior of other employees which could indicate involve-ment in illegal drugs use or trafficking. They should be encouraged to report this behavior either to management or to the appropriate law enforcement organization. Behavior such as sudden changes in appearance, new car, new clothes, or standard of living which may not be commensurate with a person’s salary, frequent request for shift changes or work stations, or loitering in the work area after hours might signal possible involvement.

An ongoing drug awareness training program should be maintained, and all employees encouraged to participate. Posters should be displayed throughout the workplace which describe the effects which drug abuse has on the health and welfare of employees, their fami-lies, and communities, and which describe how drug smuggling can affect their future as well as the organization’s.

SUMMARY

To prevent their conveyances from being used for drug smuggling, carriers must identify and correct weaknesses in the physical, pro-cedural and documentation control systems used in cargo process-ing operations.

Carriers and terminal operators should consider all segments of their cargo operations in assessing their vulnerability to drug smug-glers. They should examine the physical security systems which protect their cargo from unauthorized access as well as the proce-dures used to prevent their cargo, cargo handling equipment, cargo documentation and their personnel from being used by drug smug-glers.

Some of the steps which may assist carriers and terminal operators in preventing the use of their cargo operations for drug smuggling include:
· Identification of the carrier’s risk through a through assessment of vulnerability;
· Enhancement of physical security standards including:
- Fencing;
- Building and yards;
- Gates;
- Gate houses;
- Lighting;
- Locks, locking devices and key control;
- Closed Circuit Television Surveillance System.
· Enhancement of procedural security including:
- Security personnel;
- Communications;
- Identification systems;
- Positive Baggage Identification system;
- Cargo reception and delivery procedures;
- Security education and awareness.
· Identification of internal cargo conspiracies;
· Identification of suspect shipments through cargo documenta-tion review;
· Enhancing personnel screening and security procedures;
· An examination of procedural security standards.
 

CONCEALMENT AREAS IN AIRCRAFT AND AIR CARGO CON-TAINERS
 

Figure 1

Most commercial aircraft are basically the same. Although they differ in size and internal configuration, they are basically long metal-lic tubes with wings and a tail attached. The areas which are most commonly used for the concealment of illegal drugs aboard an air-craft are those areas where the curviture of the outer skin and the cabin structure. The illustration above depicts the tubelike construc-tions of the outer skin and the square or angled design of the inte-rior.

Internal or external access to these hollow area should be targeted as search points on the Aircraft Search Checklist. Other external areas along the fuselage and wing which are accessible through inspection plates or other panels which are easily opened by ground personnel by actuating “snap” type fasteners should also be identi-fied as search points on the checklist. Any of these access points which may be sealed with numbered paper seals.

CARGO HOLDS
The areas behind wall, floor and ceiling panels in the aircraft’s cargo holds provide ample space for concealing large loads of illegal drugs. See figure 2. Ground personnel acting on their own or in con-spiracy with others can utilize these areas to transport illegal drugs and can retrieve them easily, quickly and with little threat of being observed from outside the aircraft. Many of these panels open eas-ily with a single twist of a screwdriver or the actuation of “snap” type fasteners. These panels should be sealed with paper or wire seals which will indicate unauthorized access when broken.
 

Figure 2

Aircraft supplies which are stored in the cargo holds, such as oil hydraulic fluid, spare tires and wheel assemblies, and tool chests have all been used in the past to conceal narcotics. The frequent removal and replacement of these items in the cargo hold might indicate a possible internal conspiracy and should be reported to Customs.

AVIONICS COMPARTMENTS
Avionics compartments on many aircraft may be accessed through both internal and external access points. Because of the available space, ease of access, and the complex and dangerous equipment housed in these compartments which may inhibit thorough searches, they have been used repeatedly by smugglers. A typical avionics compartment is illustrated in figure 3.
 

Figure 3

LAVATORIES
Lavatories provide several areas for smugglers to conceal illegal drugs. They are accessible to both airline employees and passen-gers and provide quick concealment and retrievability. All hollow space in the lavatory is suspect and access points which may be sealed without effecting the safe operation of the aircraft should be sealed with numbered seals.

Beneath the toilet “Shroud” or “cowling”, there is ample space to conceal several pound of illegal drugs. Most of these shrouds are fastened by screws to prevent them being opened except for servic-ing. These screws offer little deterrent to passengers, crewmembers or ground service personnel. A typical aircraft toilet is illustrated in figure 4
 

Figure 4

The wall panels in some aircraft lavatories are secured by “velcro”. These panels are easily pulled down to provide access to the area between the outer aircraft skin and the wall for concealing illegal drugs. Other aircraft have doors or panels, facilitating access to piping for repairs, which also reveal large open areas for conceal-ment. See figure 5.
 

Figure 5

The compartments above and beneath the lavatory service module, shown in figure 5, also provide ample areas for concealing illegal drugs. These areas should be routinely searched while on the ground in drug source and transit countries. Seals should be used to seal these areas to indicate unauthorized access.

PASSENGER CABINS

there are many areas within the passenger cabin where illegal drugs may be concealed. By searching these areas routinely, airline per-sonnel may detect contraband or the attempts to utilize these areas for smuggling. Routine searches also act as a deterrent and aid in preventing the use of the aircraft for smuggling. These areas in-cluded but are not limited to the following:
· Passenger seats - illegal drugs have been concealed in the life vest pocket below many aircraft seats, also within or beneath the seat cushion, seat back and head rest.
· Air Conditioning Ducts - illegal drugs have been found concealed beneath pull-out vent covers in air conditioning ducts.
· Passenger Service Units - Located above each seat and con-taining reading lights, air blowers and emergency oxygen mask, these units have also been used to conceal illegal drugs.
· Overhead Storage Compartments - The rear of many of these storage compartments are covered with cloth which is the only barrier between the compartment and the area adjacent to the outer skin. Illegal drugs have been found in these areas sus-pended on strings which can be pulled up by the smuggler during aircraft servicing.
· Life raft storage compartments - Located in the ceiling, over-head compartments and in floor cabinets, these areas offer large spaces for concealing illegal drugs.
· Lighting panels - Some of these panels located in the ceiling open with finger twist screws or with the aid of a coin. They pro-vide access to the large area between the flat cabin ceiling and the curved roof of the aircraft. Packages of illegal drugs have also been discovered suspended on strings within the wall of the aircraft. By pulling the string, the packages may be retrieved through these panel openings. These panels and any other panels which provides access to the space between the cabin interior and the outer skin should be sealed as long as the seal-ing has no effect on the safe operation of the aircraft.

GALLEYS
The galley areas of commercial aircraft offer many areas in which to conceal illegal rugs. All cabinets, service carts, garbage bins and drawers should be examined thoroughly and routinely when prepar-ing to depart from a narcotics source or transit country. These ar-eas should be included on the checklist.

AIR CARGO CONTAINERS.
Air cargo containers have been modified to conceal illegal drugs. Compartments have been built into the floors and walls of these containers which facilitate the smuggling of hundred of pounds of illegal drugs. Air carriers should be alert for containers which are shipped “House to House”. A visual check of the exterior of the container may reveal compartments built into the floors. Shippers who regularly ship merchandise in “house to house” air containers should be considered suspect for using altered containers. These suspicions should be relayed to U.S. Customs Services.
 

Flt No.  __________________
Data/Fecha  _________________
Vuelo No.  ________________

AIRCRAFT PREDEPARTURE
INSPECTION CHECKLIST
LISTA DE INSPECCION DE AVION
ANTES DE LA SALIDA

INSPECTION CHECKLIST
LISTA DE INSPECCION

ITEMS TO BE INSPECTED
Check Off Item After Inspecting
ARTICULOS PARA INSPECCIONAR
Marque Cada Artículo Después de Inspeccionar

 Sealedsello - # 727 707 747
A. AIRCRAFT TECHNICAL AREASAREAS TECNICAS DE LA AERONAVE
1. Electronic compartmentsCompartimentos electrónicos
2. Nose landing gear wheel wellAndomiento del tren de aterrizaje de picada
3. Main landing gear wheel well (right)Andomiento, tren de aterrizaje principal (derecho)
4. Main landing gear wheel well (left)Andomiento, tren de aterrizaje principal (Izquierdo)
5. Hydraulic compartmentCompartimiento hidráulico
6. Lavatory - lower compartmentCompartimiento inferior del Lavatorio
7. Life raft compartmentsCompartimientos de botes salvavidas
8. Emergency transmission compartmentCompartimiento de transmisión de emergencia
9. Flight and voice recorder compartment (747)Compartimiento de grabadora de voz y vuelo.(747)
 Sealed  sello - # 727 707 747
10. Upper deck (747)Area posterior: puerta de emergencia.(747)
11. Chillet’s compartment (747) Compartimiento de enfriamiento (747)
12. Ventral stairs compartment (727)Comportamientos de escalera ventral. (727)
13. Oxygen bottle compartment cargo hold (747)Comp. de botellas de oxígeno en bodega de carga (747)
14. Cargo hold (727) Section 2 forward.Bodega de carga delantera (727), sección 2.
15. Access panel - Airconditioning compart-mentsPanel de acceso al comp de aire acondicionado
16. Disposable water lank acess panel.Panel de acceso al tanque de agua desechable.
17. Lower 41Baja 41
18. Lower 43Baja 43
19. Mail bags - Aft cargo compartmentSacos de correo - Bodega posterior.
20. Mail bags - Forward compartmentSacos de correo - Bodega delantera.
B. COCKPITCABINA DE MANDO
1. Complete floor areaArea completa del piso.
2. Behind instrument panelDetrás del Panel de instrumentos
3. Seats, life jackets, pockets, crew rest area (747 Combi)Sillas, chalecos salvavidas y bolsillosr, área de descanso de la tripulación (747 Combi).
4. Garbage area (747)Compartimientos de basura (747)
5. Underneath all seats.Debajo de todos los asientos.
6. Oxygen mask compartmentsCompartimientos de máscaras de oxígeno.
C. FIRST CLASS GALLEYGALERA PRIMERA CLASE.
1. Garbage compartmentCompartimiento de basura.
2. Storage CompartmentCompartimiento de almacenaje
3. Drawers, Ice buckets, tray carriers.Gavetas, cubos de hielo, portador de bandejas
Driking fountainsFuentes de agua potable
Water cups dispenserRecipientes de vasos de agua desechables.
6. Galleys.Cocinas a bordo.
7. Upper and lower compartments and drawers.Compartimientos de gavetas - inferior y poste-rior.
8. Food Carts.Carros de comida.
9. Liquor boxes.Cajas de licor.
D. CABIN AREA.AREA DE LA CABINA
1. Ceilling panels (seals)Paneles del techo (sellos)
2. Ceilling panels - lavatory (seals)Paneles del techo - baños (sellos)
3. Oxigen bottle compartments.Compartimientos de botellas de oxígeno
4. Fire extinguisher  compartment.Compartimiento de extintores.
5. Movie projector compartment (747)Compartimiento del proyector de películas (747)
6. Forward and aft coat closetsGuardaropas - delanteros y traseros.
 
 
 

 Sealed  sello - # 727 707 747
7. Forward and rear lavatories:Baños delanteros y traseros:- Containers under sink/Recipientes debajo del lavamanos.- Towel Comparment/Compartimiento de toallas- Sanitary napkin Compartment/Compartimiento de toallas sanitarias-Waste material compartment/Compartimiento de desperdicio- Behind and underneath toilet/detrás y debajo del inodoro.
8. Storage comp’ts and visible access panels (seals)Comps. de almacenaje y paneles de acceso visible (sellos)
9. Kit on boardCaja (kit) a bordo
10. Ferry Kit (747)Caja (Kit) de Ferry
11. First Aid KitsCajas de primeros auxilios
12. Magazine storage closetsArmarios (closets) de revistas.
13. Storage areas under flight attendants seat (jump seat)Area de almacenaje debajo de asientos de azafatas.
E. REAR STAIRWELL (Where applicable)ESCALERA POSTERIOR (donde aplicable)
1. Fiberglass or Velcro access panels (right & left walls)Paneles de acceso de fibra de vidrio o Velcro (paredes de derecha e izquierda)
2. Overhead access panelsPaneles de acceso de arriba (sobre la cabeza)

Remarks: (Please report anything unusual in space provided below)
 
 
 
 

Inspected by the following Individuals: And witnessed by:
Inspeccionado por los siguientes individuos: De lo cual son testigos:

1. _______________________________ 1. __________________

2. _______________________________ 2. __________________

3. _______________________________ 3. __________________

_______________________________________________________
Signature of Supervisor or Government Official
 

Note: The completion of the checklist by the designeted personnel Indicates a search of these areas was made prior arrival in the United States. It does not constitute a quarantee that controlled substances of material will not be subsequently found in the area searched upon arrival in the United States.

Nota: El completamiento de esta Lista por el personal designado indica que se llevó a cabo un registro de dichas areas antes de arribar a los Estados Unidos. Esto no constituye una garantia que las sustancias controladas no sean subsiguientemente encontradas en las areas registradas a su llegada a los Estados Unidos.